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{L.A. No. 28134. In Bank. Feb. 8, 1965.]

WILLIAM A. BROWN, JR., et a!., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. GREGORY PETER CONNOLLY et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
[1] Negligence-Evidence-Presumptions-Ordinal'7 Care.-Under
ordinary circumstances, a party unable to testify, as a result
of amnesia induced by injuries sustained in the accident sued
on, is entitled to a presumption that he acted with due care.
[2] Infants-Actions - Evidence: Negligence - Evidence - Presumptions-Ordinal'7 Care.-The disputable presumption in
Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 4, that a person takes ordinary
care of his own concerns applies to both minors and adults.
[3] ItL-Actions-Evidence: Negligence-Evidence-Presumptions
-Ordinal'7 Care.-Though a debatable advantage is afforded
young children in that their standard of care is tested against
other children of the same age, not against adults, the presumption of due care by a young child remains disputable and
may be controverted by oth-er evidence.
[4] Negligence-Care by Infants-Contributol'7 Negligence.-The
imposition of liability for contributory negligence of children
is not avoided by a due care presumption; it is determined by
{I] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 298; Am.J'ur., Negligence (1st
ed § 290).
Mclt. Dig. References: [1, 7, 8, 10, 12] Negligence, § 124(7);
[2, 3] Infants, § 24; Negligence, § 124(5) ;. [4, 6] Negligence,
§ 52(2); [6] Negligence, § 52(1); [9] Negligence, § 124(5); [11]
Negligence, §§ 124(7), 244, 245(8).
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Couneil.
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a bifurcated test that requires a ftndiDgthat the particular,·
ehild had the capacity to act negligently and then tests biB. ..
conduct by the standard of children of like age and maturity;'··
[6] Id.-Oare b, Infants-Contributorr li'egligen08.-Theage at ,
which a child has the capacity for negligence is a factual'
question to be determined by the mentality and maturity of
the particular child.
.
[6] Id.-Oare b, Infants-Degree of Oare· RequJred.-The standard of care applied to children found to have capacity for
negligent acts is that of children of like age, mental capacity,
and discretion.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Presumptions-()rdinarJ Oare.--A preaump.o.
tion of due care by one unable to testify, as a result of amnesia
suffered from injuries sustained in the· accident sued on, is
available to a child charged with contributory negligence under
the same circumstances as apply to adults, but not because
he is a child.
[8] ld.-Evidence-PresumptioU-ordinarJ Oare.-In an action
to recover for accidental injuries to a minor who allegedly
suffered amnesia as a result, no presumption of due care by
the minor arose solely by virtue of his minority.
{9] Id.-Evidence-Presumptions--OrdinarJ Oare.-Once a person
takes the stand to explain his conduct immediately prior to
or at the time in question, he is DO longer entitled to the
disputable presumption in Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, suM. 4, that
a person takes ordinary care of his own concerns.
(lO] Id.-Evidence-Preaumptions-Ordlnary Oare.-A requirement for invocation of the presumption of due care in amnesia
cases is that the loss of memory was induced by brain injury .
suffered as a result of the accident in q u e s t i o n . '
rlla, llb] Id.-Evidence-Presumptions--Ordinar)' Oare: Appeal
-Reversible Error.-In an action for personal injuries sustained in an accident by a minor, who allegedly lost his memory as a result thereof, it was reversible error to refuse to
allow psychiatric testimony as to the existence of the minor's
amnesia and to instruct on loss of memory and the presump.o
tion of due care arising therefrom, despite the fact that the
minor did not testify himself as to his amnesia though physically able to do so, where the minor, on certain occasions,
would s'V that he could not remember the accident, but at
other times would relate a version of the accident which was
allegedly the product of fantasy, so that his counsel could
not vouch for his testimouyor demonstrate to the jury how
the minor's tale differed from time to time.
[6] See Oal.lv.Sd, Negligence, 178; Am.lv., Negligence (1st
cd 135).
.
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[12] Id.-Evidence-Presumptions-Ordinary Care.-One opposing the due care presumption by a party whose amnesia as a
result of the accident sued on is established by testimony of
a medical expert rather than by the party's own testimony may
cross-examine the expert witness, produce contrary medical
testimony, and, if desired, compel the party claiming amnesia
to testify as an adverse witness under Code Civ. Proc., § 2055,
and not be bound by his testimony.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philip H. Richards, Judge. Reversed.
Action for personal injuries arising out of a collision of a
car and a bicycle. Judgment for defendants reversed.
Beilenson, Meyer, Rosenfeld & Susman, Peter R. Cohen,
Sidney M. Wolinsky and Allen E. Susman for Plaintiffs and:
Appellants.
Clausen & Gilliland, Richard M. Gilliland and Henry E.
Kappler for Defendants and Respondents.
MOSK, J.-Victor Brown, plaintiff and appellant, is a
minor child 1 who while riding his bicycle was struck by a
car driven by Gregory Peter Connolly, defendant and reo
spondent. The accident occurred in May 1957 when plaintiff
was 6 years old. Two trials have been held in this case. The
first resulted in a judgment for defendant, but it was reversed
on appeal on the ground of incorrect instructions. (Brown v.
Oonnolly (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 582 [24 Cal.Rptr. 57].)
The second trial also resulted in a judgment for defendant. .
This appeal is concerned with possible contributory negligence of the minor plaintiff and his failure to testify due to
an alleged loss of memory resulting from the accident.
[1] Under ordinary circumstances if a party cannot testify
because of amnesia induced by injuries suffered in the accident involved in the litigation, he is entitled to a presumption
that he acted with due care. (Scott v. Burke (1952) 89 Cal.2d
388 [247 P.2d 313]; Powley v. Appleby (1957) 155 Cal.
App.2e1 727 [318 P.2d 712] ; De Yo v. Umina (1953) 121 Cal.
App.2d 505 [263 P.2d 623].) This presumption heretofore
has arisen either where, the party testified as to bis own loss
1The u'tiDor '. parents are also parties to the action, but for convenience
the minor is treated as being the Bole plaintiff and appellant.
Similarly, defendant driver is treated as the sole defendant and reo
spondent.
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of memory (see Scott v. Burke, BUpra) or was ph:vBic.uv.:
well as mentally unable to testify (see Larsen v. '~"",",1i-v.JI
T.4 8. P. By. Co. (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 21 [1 vcw....lIpw:.
86].) Plaintiff here did not take the stand, even thc)Qhlll
physically able, for reasons that will appear later.
he attempted to establish the fact of his amnesia LllCUU~'ll
testimony of a psychiatrist. The court sustained an objeetiolf:l
to the psychiatrist's testimony and ultimately refused to
a jury instruction on the presumption of due care as req:Ut!ll~
by plaintiff. Plaintiff further requested an instruction
he was entitled to a presumption of due care solely by
of his minority. That instruction was also refused.
We :first consider whether a minor is entitled to a Pl'EISUIDp.;:!J
tion of due care solely by virtue of his minority.
In asserting the affirmative of ,that proposition, pllrln·tift',~
relies upon the cases of Van Der Most v. Workman (1951) :
107 Cal.App.2d 274 [236 P.2d 842], McKay v. Hedger (1984).
139 Cal.App. 266 [84 P.2d221], and Barrett v.
.
(1931) 115 Cal.App. 283 [1 P.2d 458]. While these cases
involved a minor plaintiff and a defense of contributory negli- ,
gence and revolved around section 1963, subdivision 4, of
the Code of Civil Procedure which provides for a disputable'
presumption "That a person takes ordinary care of his own
concerns, " they are not helpful authority to us here.
[2] Unquestionably the code section applies to minors'"
well as to adults. [8] A debatable advantage is afforded
children of tender years in that their standard of care is to
be tested against other ehildren of the same age and not
against adults, but the presumption of due care remains disputable and may be controverted by other evidence.
There is no convineingauthority in California or in any
jurisdietion holding that a minor is entitled to a presumption
of due care solely by virtue of age. The thrust of the discussion in most foreign cases tends, in fact, to indicate an attitude that young children generally do not aet in due regard
for their own safety.1 Yet courts have not let this eonsideraI' • OhUdrel\ are capricious, they act heeclleaal,. withod ai'ring the ,
alighteat warning of their intentions. The,. dart here and there with the
exuberance of ;youth." (Frau v. Cohefl. (1927) 288 Pa. 221, 225 [135 .
A. 624]; lee also Webster v. Lv.q7eow (1935) 219 Iowa 1048 [258 N.W.
685]; Dennehy v. Joraafl. Marsh Co. (1947) 321 M&88. 78 [71 N.E.2d
758]; mnmGfl. 'V. Mitchell (1953) 13 N.J. 412 [99 A.2d 809]; X,",l;cr
v. NBfD ::ForI; Cefl.t. , H.1l.1l. Co. (1891) 124 N.Y. 308 [26 N.E. 916.
21 Am.Bt.Rep. 670]; BogWfI. v • .4tlan'Sc Coast LiM B. Co. (1937) III
N.O. ll3 [189 B.E. 177]; Dallas By. I" X_(t!4l Co. v. Bogers (1949)
147 Tn:. 617 [218 B.W.2d 456] j and Morris v. Pegtor& (1927) 148 Va.
•. 812 [139 B.E. 500].)
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tion result in more stringent standards of care for children.
[4] The imposition of liability for contributory negligence
of children is not avoided by means of a due care presumption; it is determined by a bifurcated test which requires a
finding that the particular child had the capacity to act negligently and then tests the child's conduct by the standards of
children of like age and maturity. This methodology protects
children from unreasonably lofty liability standards while
holding them liable when the facts justify it, and avoids the
unsupportable conclusion that young children generally act
with due regard for their own safety.
The particular means of application vary from state to state.
The California rule is similar to the general pattern while
avoiding the arbitrary chronological age limits used in many
states. [Ii] In California the age of capacity is a factual
question to be determined by the mentality and maturity of
the particular child. [6] The standard of care applied to
children found to have capacity for negligent acts is that of
children of like age, mental capacity, and discretion. (Oahill
'v. E. B. ~ A. L. Stone 00. (1914) 167 Cal. 126 [138 P. 712] ;
Todd v. Orcutt (1919) 42 Cal.App. 687 [183 P. 963]; and
Barrett v. Harman (1931) supra, 115 Cal.App. 283.)
The California rule appears to be reasonable and workable. [7] The presumption of due care requested by plaintiff in the instant ease is available to a child charged with
contributory negligence under the same circumstances as apply
to adults, but not because he is a child. (Van Der Most v.
Worktnan (1951) supra, 107 Cal.App.2d 274, and Barrett v.
Harman (1931) supra, 115 Cal.App. 283.) There appears to
be no necessitJl to create a new application of the presumption
of due care solely because of the minority of the individual,
since present rules protect against charging minors with a
standard of care they cannot meet. [8] We hold, therefore,
that no presumption of due care arose solely by virtue of the
plaintiff's minority.
This, then, brings us to the problem of amnesia.
[9] The presumption of section 1963, subdivision 4, has
been limited to certain types of situations. The basic rule is
that once a person takes the stand to explain his conduct immediately prior to or at the time in question, he is no longer
entitled to the presumption. (Laird v. T. W. Mather, Inc.
(1958) 51 Ca1.2d 210, 221 [331 P.2d 617].) The two areas
in which the presumption is now allow('d are actions for wrong-
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ful death (Anthony v. Hobbie (1945) 25 Cal.2d 814 [155
826J; Westberg v. WiUde (1939) 14 Cal.2d 360 [94
590]; McBaine, Cal. Evidence Manual (2d ed. 1960) §
pp. 472475; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (1958)§§ 65-67, pp.
86) and those cases where by reason of brain injury the party:'·
suffers from retrograde amnesia and cannot remember and
testify concerning his C'.onduct at and immediately before the
accident (Scoff v. Burke (1952) 8Upra,39 Cal.2d 388; Kum~ .
lauskas v. Cozzi (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 641 [343P.2d 605];
,McBaine, Cal. Evidence Manual, 8Upra; Witkin, Cal. Evidence,
8upra).
[10] A requirement for invocation of the presumption in ..
amnesia cases is that the loss of memory was induced by brain .
injury sutfered as a result of the accident in question. (Kume-,~
lauskas v. Cozzi (1959) 8Upra, 173 Cal.App.2d 641, 544, and
cases cited.) It has further been held that the amnesia must
be genuine and that this is a question for the trier of fact to·
. determine. (Scott v. Burke (1952) 8Upra, at p. 393; Hensley
v. Hams (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 821, 825 [312 P.2d 414}.)
[11a.] Plaintiff appears to have met the foregoing requirements, a.nd would unquestionably have been entitled to the
benefits of the presumption, except for one complicating factor: he was not called to the stand to testify as to his own
loss of memory. Plaintiff offered to prove ";is amnesia through
the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him. The.
proposed testimony of the medical doctor was not permitted
by the court upon objection of defendant. The court insisted '
that before an expert witness could testify as to his opinion
about the loss of memory, a proper foundation must be laid for
the expert testimony, and that the foundation would best be
provided by the testimony of the plaintiff unless he was physically unable to take the stand. Since the plaintiff was physically able to take the stand, the court would not permit the
expert opinion testimony.
Plaintiff has analogized his plight to situations in which
medical testimony was introduced to establish that a party's
physical condition made it impossible or extremely hazardous
for him to testify. (Larsen v. Atchison, '1'. cfS.F. By. Co.
(1959) supra, 176 Cal.App.2d 21; Hugkes v. City cf County
of San Francisco (1958) 158 Ca1.App.2d 419 [322 P.2d 623];
Bay v. Henderson (1963) 212 qa1.App.2d 192 [27 Cal.Rptr.
847].) Plaintiff contends that he suffered a mental disability
equivalent to a physical disability which would excuse him.
All the cases relied upon by plaintiff involve factual situa-

i
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tions in which the party not testifying was either mentally or
physically so disabled as to prevent his appearance on the
stand. No contention has been made that plaintiff is physically
unable to testify. His body could have been produced. He
does claim that his mental disability is one step removed from
the usual amnesia, that on certain occasions he will say he
cannot remember anything about the accident, but that on
other occasions he will relate a version of the accident. His
versions of the accident are seldom the same and are allegedly
the product of fantasy. Thus, if called to the stand, plaintiff
mayor may not testify as to loss of memory, or he may purport to relate a version of the accident. In the latter circumstance his counsel would neither be able to vouch for plaintiff's testimony, nor could he demonstrate to the jury how
the plaintiff's tale differs from time to time without in effect
impeaching his own witness. As an escape from this dilemma
the testimony of the psychiatrist was offered. Whereas if the
minor were produced the jury would have been asked to judge
on the basis of a single narration whether the story that he
might tell is a real or fanciful recollection of events, here
counsel proposed to usc an expert who had listened to the
child on numerous occa.o;ions and has had an opportunity to
llear and compare different related versions of the event.
The predicament of a party wishing to have the benefit of
the presumption but understandably not desiring to testify
as to his own loss of memory is balanced against the normal
difficulty courts experience to detect cases of less than genuine amnesia. Undoubtedly the prevailing rules have a salutary effect in preventing those merely feigning amnesia from
using the presumption of due care as a means of avoiding weak
testimony and submitting to revealing cross-examination.
Generally the best antidote for a malingerer is the scrutiny of
an alert jury.
On the other hand, the compGlsory testimony rule invoked
here is unreasonably inflexible. An iron curtain has been
created batween physical incapacity to testify and mental incapacity, expert medical testimony as to the former being
allowed, while medical testimony as to thc latter is not, unless
the mental incapacity has 'required institutionaiization of the
party. (See Larsen v. Atchison, T. & S.P. By. Co. (1959)
supra, 176 Cal.App.2d 21.)
We cannot approve this arbitrary rule. [12] The procedure here required by the trial court provides less assurance

)
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, •of ascertainment of the truth than does the testimony
competent medical expert, for the party opposing th!3
care presumption may (a) cross-examine the expert wi1;neilk.
and the jury may choose to reject the expert's evidence
to loss of memory; (b) produce contrary medical testimoni
and (c) if he wishes, compel the party claiming amnesia,',to
testify as an adverse witness under section 2055 of the, Code
of Civil Procedure and not be bound by his testimony.
No persuasive reason has been suggested as to why ,the
testimony of a qualified psychiatrist would not be adequate .'
proof that a person incurred an injury as a result of an aeci-' .,.
dent which has caused him to suffer from a loss of
of "
'·'the facts before and during the occurrence of the aec:ide:nt.
This is a subject peculiarly within the ken, of a psychiatrist,"
and particularly under the ,circumstances of this case the
expert's testimony would appear to be more reliable than
of the minor plainti:fI. Courts have recognized experts' retia-'
bility in cases involving physical disability, such as Bay v.
Henderson (1963) supra, 212 CalApp.2d 192, where a physician testined that a witness would probably suffer an additional
heart seizure if he took, the stand. Here, as there, tbe jury '.
would understandably have more conndence in the expert than ,.::
in the patient on a medical issue.
,,',
There has been an increasing albeit tardy willingness '
courts to consider uncommon mental and psychological prob- , ,
lems as medical phenomena and thus appropriate subjects for.
expert testimony. (See, e.g., Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955),
pp. 38-40 and 176-180.) The court-adopted rule tbat a person
must testify as to his own loss of memory in order to be entitled to a presumption of due care should be another casualtY ,."'"
of this trend. No increased danger of fraud upon the courts
will result whieh is not outweighed by the decreased ability
of a p8.1'ty who remains silent to convince the jury of the "
validity of his claim.
'
[l1b] The trial court erred in excluding psychiatric testi~
mony and in failing to give an appropriate instruction on loss
of memory and the presumption of ordinary care. The errors
compel a reversa! and a new trial.
The judgment is reversed.
Peters,

l'., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and

Burke, J., concurred.

TRAYNOR, C. J., Concttrring.-I adhere to the views set
forth in my dissenting opinions in Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d
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585,590 [128 P.2d 16], and Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388,402
[247 P.2d 313], that presumptions are not evidence and that a
presumption should not be invoked against the party who
already has the burden of proving that the presumed fact does
not exist. I concur in the judgment under the compulsion of
those cases, however, for they are the law of this state until
they are overruled or changed by statute.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Fourt in the opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal, which reads,
as follows:
"This is anappeaP by plaintiffs, Victor Brown, a minor,
and his parents, William A. Brown, Jr., and Enolla Brown,
from a 'Judgment on Verdict in Open Court' entered in favor
of defendants in an action for personal injuries suffered by
Victor Brown arising out of a collision between an automobile
driven by defendant Connolly and a bicycle ridden by plaintiff Victor Brown.
"Plaintiffs' contentions on this appeal relate to whether the
trial court erred 'in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction affording to the infant Victor the presumption of due
care in his own behalf and in refusing to allow plaintiffs,
through an expert witness, to give an explanation to the jury
of plaintiff Victor's failure to testify.'
"There is no question with reference to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the judgment. While there were some minor
discrepancies in the evidence at the two trials, the opinion
of Mr. Justice Fox in the first appeal of this case (Brown v.
Connolly, 206 Cal.App.2d 582 [24 Cal.Rptr. 57]), succinctly
and accurately sets forth the basic facts relating to the occurence of the accident, and the statement therein contained is
hereby expressly incorporated by reference herein. The facts
which are particularly relevant and material to the various
contentions presently made by plaintiffs will be set forth under
the respective contentions.
"Plaintiffs' first contention is that the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury that the minor plaintiff was
presumed to have exercised due care in his own behalf. PlainttlThis is the second appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants.
The ease was originally tried before 'a jury. The cause was reversed on
nppeal solely upon the ground that an erroneous instruction had been
given by the trial court. (Brown v. Connolly, 206 Cal.App.2d 582 [24
Cal.Rptr. 57].) "
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tiffs' proferred instruction is set forth in the footnote. II Two'
arguments in support of this contention are advanced : 7
d
H First, that the mere fact of minority insulates a minor·
plaintiff with the presumption of due care where the defense
of contributory negligence is asserted against the minor.
"In support of this position plaintiffs cite and rely upon
the cases of Barrett v. Harman, 115 Ca1.App. 283 [1 P.2d 458] ;
Van Der Most v. Workman, 107 Cal.App.2d 274 {236 P.2d
842]; and McKay v.Hedger, 139 Cal.App. 266 {34 P.2d 221].
The Barrett case, which is cited in both the Van Der Most case
and McKay case, does not represent the correct rule. In·
Barrett, the infant plaintiff, age 11, testified that he crossed
the street in a crosswalk. The defense attempted to impeach
him. A verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff and the
defense asserted on the appeal that the evidence showed contributory negligence as a matter of law. In affirming, the court
stated that the 'presumption is that the child was at aU times
exercising due care for its own safety (Code Civ. Proc. § 1963,
subd. 4).' (P. 286.)
"Code of Civil Procedure, section 1963, subdivision 4, is no
authority for singling out a child, as distinguished from an
adult or any other person, insofar as this particular presumption is concerned. This section merely provides that' a person
takes ordinary care of his own concerns,' and does not distinguish between age groups. It is now established that an
instruction on due care should not be given when the party
who seeks to invoke it testifies concerning his conduct immediately prior to or at the time of the accident. (Laird v. T. W.
Mather, Inc., 51 Ca1.2d 210 [331 P.2d 617].)
"Recent cases have clearly crystalized the law and it has
been held that the presumption of due care is proper in two
situations: (1) in an action for wrongful death there is a
presumption that the decedent exercised ordinary care for his
own concerns; (Anthony v. Hobbie, 25 Ca1.2d 814 {155 P.2d
826]; Westberg v. Willde, 14 Ca1.2d360 [94 P.2d 590] ; Mc-

P

...

)

"2' The law presumes that Victor Brown in his conduct at the time
of and ~ediately preceding the accident was exercising ordinary care
and· was obeying the law.
" 'This presumption is a form of evidence. It will support a finding
in accord with the presumption, where there is no proof to the contrary;
and it will support such a finding in the face of contrary evidence if
your judgment so directs after weighing the eonflicting evidence.
" 'When such a conflict exists, it is the jury's duty to weigh the
presumption and any evidence that may support it against the eontrary
evidence and to determine which, if either, preponderates. Such deliberations, of course, shall be related to and be in accordance with my
instructions on the burden of proof.' "
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Baine, Cal. Evidence Manual [2d ed. 1960] § 1291, pp. 472475; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (1958) §§65-67, pp. 84-86.)
(2) where by reason of brain injury the party suffers from
retrograde amnesia and cannot remember and testify concerning his conduct at and immediately before the accident. (Scott
v. Burke, 39 Ca1.2d 388 [247 P.2d 313] j Kumelauskas v. Cozzi,
173 Cal.App.2d 541 [343 P.2d 605] ; McBaine, Cal. Evidence
Manual, supra j Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra.) The mere fact
of minority does not entitled [sic] plaintiff Victor to the bene'fit of the presumption.
"The second argument advanced is that plaintiffs were entitled to the instruction on due care because plaintiff V iotor
was prevented from testifying about the circumstances of the
accident by reason of a brain injury received in the accident
and plaintiffs produced no eyewitnesses' testimony concerning
the accident.
"What is stated in the case of Coe v. Southern Pacific Co.,
203 Cal.App.2d 509, at page 516 [21 Cal.Rptr. 731], is perti.nent with respect to the unusual factual situation presented
in the case at bar:
" 'The philosophy which permits the presumption to be considered is, that when the person whose conduct is in question
is unable to testify due to death, loss of memory or other circumstances beyond his control, the law provides testimony
for him by the presumption of due care. To allow the use of
the presumption where the person merely does not choose to
testify would be illogical and contrary to the reasons for jts
use. Thus the driver of an automobile involved in an action,
who, if he testiiied would have to admit that he was completely
at fault, could merely refrain from testifying and then have
the benefit of the presumption that he was not at fault.'
( I talies added.)
"The case at bar presents the unusual situation of where
the attorney for plaintiffs refused to place the minor plaintiff
on the stand. Rather, plaintiffs attempted to lay the foundation for the presumption solely with medical testimony. The
reason for thts refusal was stated by plaintiffs' attorney as
follows:
" 'Mr. Cohen: ... But I might point out, your Honor, that
our whole theory of this case is that it is a presumption case
and that Victor is entitled to the presumption.
" 'Now, our problem in calling Victor is, one, at the time
of the accident he was only six years old j and, two, as his
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deposition sMws, he will state at tla'lling timu that he eitkejo
can't recall it or he will make vp a story about if.
'"
I I , He told in his deposition, 1 beUetle, three or four dif!ere~;
.tories, aU conflicting, and he has told me on I6parafe occasioftI
that he can't remember it.
'
It 'Now, vnde,. these circumstances it'. impossible for ""
to call the boy becattBe we can't tlovch for his testimO'nY, and
vnless we can lay, the foundation for the presumption through '
the doctor, our main theory of this,' case u gone. '(Italics
added.)
HThe minorplaintiiI was available 80 that it was notimpossible for plaintiffs' attorney to call him as a witness. On
the contrary, plaintiffs even suggested that defendants call
the minor plaintilf as a witness. 8 The ease of Hughes v. Oity
ct Oounty of San Prancisco, 158 Cal.App.2d 419 {322 P.2d
623], relied upon by plaintiffs is not apposite. In the Hvghes
ease it would appear that it was impossible for plaintiff to have
testified at the trial. The court stated at page 420 that:
" ' ••. Her mental deterioration came on about the time of
her second fall and may have been due to her physical condition or her age. She could not appear or testify by deposition
at either trial.'
HIt was incumbent upon plaintiffs to lay the necessary foundation before they were entitled to the presumption. The
trial court did not err.
"In addition to what has already been stated there is another
separate reason why plaintiffs were not entitled to have their
proffered instruction given. Neither side to the within appeal
raised the issue but it is established that the trial court has
the right to refuse an instruction, erroneous on its face, without modifying it. (See eases cited 42A West's Cal. Dig., Trial,
§ 261, pp. 388-393.)
"An instruction on the presumption of due care which was
substantially similar to that proffered by plaintiffs was held
to be erroneous in KumeZauskas v. Cozzi, 173 Cal.App.2d 541
"8The Reporter'. Tranaeript discloses the following in pertinent part:
" 'Mr. Gilliland: We don't have any testimony that the boy doesn't
remembet it.
" 'Mr. Oohen: Where can the testimony come from' We ean't"'Mr. Gilliland: From the boy.
" 'Mr. Oohen: Y011 put tlte boy on.
" 'The Court: If you want the benefit of the presumption, wh;r, of
course, ;rou are the one that has to establish the basis of the amnesia.
" 'I am going to Bustain the objection.
" 'Mr. Gilliland: Thank ;rou, your Honor.' (Italics added.) I I
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[343 P.2d 605]. The proper instruction is set forth in 1
B.A.J.I. No. 135-B (New).
"Lastly, plaintiffs assert that 'Irrespective of the Applicability of the Presumption of Due Care, a Party who Does
Not Appeal [sic] and Testify at the Trial May Introduce
Medical Testimony Concerning the Reason for His Non-Appearance. '
"Plaintiffs cite and rely upon the case of Ray v. Henderson,
212 Cal.App.2d 192 [27 Cal.Rptr. 847J. In the Ray case, as
in the case at bar, the deposition of the party had been taken
prior to the trial. At the trial, the defendant, whose deposition had been taken, did not testify. His physician testified
that the defendant was suffering from an inoperable cancer
of the stomach, had suffered from a heart attack, and was in
such physical condition that, if the defendant were to testify
it might produce an acute heart failure or another heart
attack which would imperil his life. The deposition of defendant was then read in its entirety. The court concluded that
the doctor's testimony with reference to the peril which might
be encountered if the defendant took the stand was proper.
"The Ray case is in nowise similar to the case at bar. The
deposition of plaintiff Victor was never read at the trial.
There is nothing in the testimony of either of plaintiffs ' expert
witnesses which would indicate that the minor plaintiff was
unable to testify at the trial. The objection was sustained to
the question of whether the psychiatrist had an opinion as to
whether Victor could recall the accident and the circumstances
preceding it-not to whether Victor was physically .ble to
testify at the trial. "

